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HOME FINANCING AT THE CROSSROADS-A STUDY
OF THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION*
RICHARD W. BARTKE
The increased activity of the federal government in the field of home
financing is well known and has been repeatedly discussed.' Congressional
legislation has, over the years, provided a large number of governmental
and quasi-governmental bodies directly or indirectly active in the field.
The importance attached to the problem by Congress is attested to, inter
alia, by the fact that home financing has attained cabinet status.2 These
various agencies, although their tasks are frequently overlapping, per-
form several distinct functions. Some of them are regulatory agencies
which supervise certain segments of the financial community.3 Others
are designed primarily to insure or guarantee certain kinds of mortgage
loans to make them more acceptable to private lenders,4 and thus these
* This article is based on a study prepared by me for the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation. The consent of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to use the study as a basis for this
article is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are my own and do
not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
or the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
The final revision of the manuscript was made in early July, 1972. Any develop-
ments after July 1, 1972, are not reflected.
' Professor of Law, Wayne State University; on leave 1972-73 Fulbright-
Hays Visiting Professor of Law, University of Tehran.
1. See Colean, A Review of Federl Mortgage Lending and Insured Practices,
8 J. Fix. 249 (1953); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DEcENT
HOmE 54-100 (1968) [hereinafter cited as DECENT HOME]; NATIONAL COMIiiSSION ON
URBAN PROBLEmS, BUILDING THE AmERICAN CITY 94-180 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
AMERICAN CITY].
2. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was created
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 89-174, 79
Stat. 667 (1965) (codified in scattered sections of 3, 5, 12, 42 U.S.C.). However,
all housing functions of the federal government are not handled by HUD, a fact
recently complained of by Secretary Romney. See Hearings on HR. 13694, H.R.
14639, H.R. 154o2 & H.R. xx Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 539 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 197o House Hearings].
3. E.g., The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and the Federal Home
Loan Bank System, created by the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of July 22, 1932,
ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725, as amended 12 U.S.C. § 1421 et seq. (1970).
4. E.g., The Federal Housing Administration, created by the National Hous-
ing Act of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246, as amended 12 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.
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agencies have a direct influence on the kind, location and quality of
housing being built.5 Finally, there are institutions whose main task is
to provide additional amounts of money for home construction and home
purchase.6  A recent addition to this last group is the Federal Home Loan
'Mortgage 'Corporation, created by title III of the Emergency Home
Finance Act of 1970.'
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation has been in
operation for just over a year. Even in this short period of time it has
already asked Congress for amendmentss to its Charter Act because of
the stringent limitations on its operations.' The agency has been in ex-
istence long enough to give us an indiction of where it is going, but not
long enough to have acquired a ballast of historical background which
might fossilize its structure. Therefore, the time would seem to be pro-
pitious for an examination of its background, its present structure and the
direction in which it should be moving.
BACKGROUND
It is obvious that the home construction market depends on financing.
Home buyers seldom have enough cash to make such a purchase. Even
those who have sufficient cash or could obtain it without borrowing, usual-
ly rely on financing. Favorable tax provisions0 and a rising market for
investments make it wiser to borrow the greater part of the purchase price
(1970). While the term Federal Housing Administration (FHA) is no longer used
in the statute, it became so ingrained in the language of the industry that it continues
to be employed. The FHA's functions are now performed by a branch of HUD.
5. FHA's concept of its function in this respect can be gauged by reading 7
FHA MANUAL, UNDERWRITING HANDBOOK, HOME MORTGAGES (1959). For a brief
discussion of FHA's role in urban sprawl, see Bartke, The Federal Housling Adinin-
istration: Its History and Operations, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 651, 658 & n.48 (1967).
6. E.g., The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), created in their present
form by title VIII of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, ch. 448, 82 Stat.
536, as amended 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-23d (1970). For the history and background of these
organizations, see Bartke, Fannie Mae and the Secondary Mortgage Market, 66 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bartke]. For a short discussion from the
agency's perspective, see Hunter, The Federal National Mortgage Association: Its
Response to Critical Financial Requirements of Housing, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 818
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Hunter]. For a discussion from a business perspective,
see Breckenfeld, Nobody Pours It Like Fannie Mae, FORTUNE, June 1972, at 86.
7. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (1970).
8. S. 1671, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. tit. III (1971); H.R_ 7740, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
tit. III (1971).
9. For the positions of the Corporation and of the FHLBB, see the summary
of the testimony of FHLBB Chairman Preston Martin, in FHLBB JouRNAL, May
1971, at 4.
10. INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, §§ 121, 163, 164, 1014, 1034. See generally AMERIcAN
CITY, supra note 1, at 399-401.
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and invest the cash in stocks or land. Real estate development or invest-
ment via financing is also profitable to the commercial sector, where ad-
vantageous tax provisions1 and the "leverage" principle' greatly increase
the effective rate of return. Besides buyers, home builders need an ample
supply of construction financing since most builders are small and under-
capitalized." For all of these reasons, it becomes apparent that the home
construction and home purchase market cannot function effectively with-
out a steady supply of mortgage money.14
Unfortunately, the home mortgage market lacks several prerequisites
of a smoothly operating market and therefore finds it difficult to compete
with other money markets for the available amount of savings. First, the
trading units are usually too large to attract modest investors. Secondly,
the units lack homogeneity and fungibility. Mortgages are different from
each other in a bewildering number of ways. The principal amounts are
different and vary from installment payment to installment payment. The
interest rates are different. Many of the provisions depend on the idiosyn-
crasy of the originator. Furthermome, each of the fifty states has a dif-
ferent set of mortgage laws." Also, the security of the instrument depends
on the financial responsibility of the borrower and on the value of the real
estate itself which, in turn, depends on a host of factors from the economic
condition of the general area to the condition of the immediate neighbor-
hood.' Thirdly, there are servicing problems to consider. Unlike most
forms of investment, such as corporate equities, bonds and debentures,
which present few servicing problems, mortgages need continual atten-
11. The most important provision is that governing accelerated depreciation
deductions on new construction. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 167. See also Treas. Reg. §
1.167 (1956).
12. "Leverage" is the ability to control large investment with a small outlay
of equity capital, used by investors to enhance the rate of return or capital
gain on a given investment.
Dasso, Changing Economic Conditions and the Coneainnation Value of Real Property,
48 On. L. REv. 237, 241 n.7 (1969). See generally Miller, Real Estate Syndication
Under the California Corporate Securities Law of r968, 16 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 371 (1969).
13. See Lefcoe & Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers, 75 YArx
LJ. 1271, 1273-79 (1966).
14. See STAm OF SuBcomm. ON HOUSING OF THE SENATE Comm. ON BANKING AND
CURRENcY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY OF MORTGAGE CREDIT, DOES THE DECADE 1961-
70 PosE PROBLEmS IN PRIvATE HOUSING AND MORTGAGE MARKETS WHICH REQUIRE
LEGISLATION BY 1960? (1960) [hereinafter cited as MORTGAGE CREDIT].
15. For a summary of the state foreclosure procedures, and of the time and cost
involved therein, see A.B.A. Committee on Mortgage Law and Practice, Cost and Time
Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROPERTY PROB. & TRUSTS J. 413 (1968).
16. For further discussion of the mortgage instrument, see Bartke, supra note
6, at 4-6; see also The Secondary Mortgage Market, MONTHIY BUSINESS REv. FED.
REs. BANK OF CLzvEAND, July 1971, at 14, 17-18 [hereinafter cited as REs. BANK OF
CLEVELAND].
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tion."7 Lastly, mortgages lack liquidity or marketability and therefore,
once again, are at a disadvantage when compared to competing invest-
ments. Corporate securities benefit from an efficient, well-developed
secondary operation. The buyer of securities traded on one of the ex-
changes or on the over-the-counter market can quickly convert his invest-
ment into money, an option not open to the mortgage investor.
Authorities have long suggested that if home financing is to be com-
petitive in today's money market, an effective secondary market for mort-
gages must be established." That is, a way should be provided for mort-
gage investors
in an organized fashion either to dispose of mortgages in their
portfolios through sale or to convert such mortgages into securi-
ties acceptable to other segments of the investing public, directly
or indirectly."9
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was
established to perform this service for the FHA/VA sector of the mort-
gage market.2" Fannie Mae's success in stemming the financial "crisis"
of 1969-702 led to demands by the savings and loan industry for a simi-
lar facility to service the conventional mortgage market.22 Adding to
these demands was the fact that savings and loan associations had borne
17. See MORTGAGE CREDIT, supra note 14, at 285-86.
18. See Hearings on Mortgage Market Problems Before the Subconi n. on
Housing of the Sen. Comnn. on Banking and' Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955);
0. JONES & L. GREBLER, THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET, ITS PURPOSE, PFRFOR-
MANCE AND POTENTIAL (1961).
19. Bartke, .upra note 6, at 7-8.
20. See generally Bartke, supra note 6.
21. See Bartke, supra note 6, at 50-55; 197o House Hearings, supra note 2, at
604-10 (statement of Secretary Romney); RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND, supra note 16,
at 14,22-23.
For descriptions of the condition of mortgage markets in 1969-70, see Hearings
on S. 2958, S. 3503, S. 3508 & S. 3442 Before the Subcoinm. on Housing and Urban
Affairs of the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Senate Hearings]; Mayer, The Housing Shortage Goes Cri-
tical, FORTUNE, Dec. 1969, at 86; Klaman, The Outlook for Housing and Mortgage
Markets, COMM. & FIN. CHRONicAL, May 7, 1970, at 17, col. 3, at 47, col. 5; Maisel,
Mortgage Money in the 197o's, Bus. EcoN., Sept. 1970, at 35; Schwartz, Policies and
Techniques for the Mortgage Market, Bus. EcoN., SEPT. 1970, at 40.
While money was scarce throughout the economy during the 1969-70 crisis, the
crunch was felt most severely in home financing and home construction. See MORT-
GAGE INTEREST RATES COMMISSION, REPORT ON MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES 22-27 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES]. Several institutional suppliers of
home credit either abandoned the market altogether or radically curtailed their invest-
ments.
22. Bartke, supra note 6, at 61-62.
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the brunt of supplying credit for home ownership during the 1966 and
1969-70 "crises. 2
3
The Savings and Loan Industry
The savings and loan industry has its roots in the 19th century, both
in England and in this country. It started as a series of mutual coopera-
tive associations, the aims of which were (1) to provide a means for pro-
fitable investment of modest savings of its members, and (2) to pool those
savings for the purpose of increasing home ownership.24 The only char-
acteristic which modern savings and loan associations have retained from
their original models is their commitment, both practical and legal, to the
financing of improved real estate. " In all other aspects they have under-
gone tremendous structural changes and can no longer be viewed as ag-
gregations of small scale savers, pooling their resources for a particular
goal. On the contrary, the leaders of the industry are huge financial in-
stitutions performing a specialized service in the nation's money markets.
The industry is by no means monolithic. On the contrary, there are
both structural and legal differences among industry members. First,
some savings and loan associations are chartered by states" and, there-
23. "Savings and loan associations accounted for 53 per cent of the increase in
home mortgage credit during the first three quarters of 1969 compared to their more
normal 45 per cent . . . ." 197o House Hearings, supra note 2, at 534 (statement of
FHLBB Chairman Preston Martin). As money policies tightened during the 1969-
70 crisis, the entire savings and loan industry encountered considerable problems. See
Grebler & Doyel, Effect of Industry Structure and Government Policies on Housing
Demand and Cyclical Stability: Study of 1966 Experience, in 3 STUDY OF THE SAVINGS
AND LOAN INDUSTRY 1241 (I. Friend ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Grebler] ; Duesen-
berry, Appraisal of Selected Policy Instruments Affecting Savings and Loan Associa-
tions, in 4 STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 1591 (I. Friend ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Duesenberry].
For tables showing mortgage activities of the principal groups of institutional
investors, see 57 FED. PRS. BULL. A52-A55 (Nov. 1971).
24. J. EwALD, A BUSINESS REBORN: THE SAVINGS AND LOAN STORY 1930-1960, at
72-90 (1962) ; L. RoDWIN, HOUSING AND ECONOMIc PROGRESS: A STUDY OF HOUSING
EXPERIENCES OF BOSTON's MIDDLE-INcomE FAMILIES 26-34 (1961); Sause, Associations
"For the Meritorious Purpose of... Mutual Benefit": A Chronicle of the Building and
Loan Industry in Maryland from 1852-1961, 22 MD. L. REv. 1, 91 (1962).
25. Illustrative is the case of federally chartered savings and loan associations,
where the governing statute provides in part:
Such associations shall lend their funds only on the security of their savings
accounts or on the security of first liens upon real property ...which con-
stitute first liens upon homes, combinations of homes and business property,
other dwelling units, or combinations of dwelling units, including homes, and
business property involving only minor or incidental business use .
12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1970).
26. There are at present 5,632 operating associations in the country. Of these,
3,585 are chartered by various states and 2,047 by the federal government. Source:
Letter dated Jan. 5, 1972, from Kenneth M. Plant, Director of Research, Federal Home
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fore, dependent for their legal framework on the applicable state statute
and subject to its regulatory authority, while since 1933, increasingly
larger numbers are chartered by the federal government.27 This latter
group automatically become members of appropriate federal home loan
banks and are subject to supervision by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB).28 The industry is also divided into those associations
which are owned by shareholders and those which are chartered on the
mutual principle. At present all federal associations must be mutual,2"
although bills pending before Congress would change that.30 Most state
associations are mutual too, since not all states permit the chartering of
stock associations.8 However, the stock associations are among the
leaders of the industry, and although their absolute numbers are relatively
small, they loom very large in terms of assets and growth. 2 Finally, most
associations are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration. 8 This insurance is available not only to federally chartered
associations but also to qualified state associations.8 4 Although in numeri-
cal terms there are still many associations which do not qualify or have
not applied for insurance, 5 in terms of assets they play a relatively insign-
ificant role.
Despite these variations, there is sufficient commonality of interests
Loan Mortgage Corp., to Richard W. Bartke (a copy of which is on file in the offices
of the Indiana Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Letter].
27. See 12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq. (1970).
28. Id. §§ 1464(a), 1464(f).
29. Id. § 1464(b) (1), (2).
30. S. 1671, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1971); H.R. 7740, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §
101 (1971). Hearings on the bill have disclosed deep differences of opinion on the
matter within the industry. See Hearings on S. 1671 Before the Subcomm. on Housing
and Urban Affairs of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as x97i Senate Hearings].
31. Twenty states authorize stock associations. .ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-402
(1956); ARKc. STAT. ANN. § 67-803 (1947); CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 5500, 6400 (1968);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 122-2-4, 122-2-5 (1963); HAwAIREv. STAT. §§ 407-14, 407-
15 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 26-1803 (1968) ; ILL. REV. STAT. CI. 32, §§ 728, 761 (1970);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-5401, 17-5402 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 144 (1966);
MIcr. ComP. LAWS ANN. §§489.910 to 489.920 (Supp. 1972) ; Miss. CoDE ANN. § 5290
(1956); Nav. REv. STAT. §§ 673.080, 673.080-3 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-15-58
(Supp. 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1151.20 (1968); ORE. REV. STAT. § 722.035(1969) ; TEX REV. Civ. STAT. art. 852(a), § 2.02 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 7-
13-2, 7-13-31 (1971) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-133 (1966); WASH. REV. CODE § 384&020
(1964) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-279.01, 13-279.1 (1965).
32. See Hester, Omership and Behavior in the Savings and Loan Industry, in
CONVERSION OF MUTUAL SAVINGS AND LoAN ASSOCIATIONS TO STOci FORM: LEGAL AND
EcoNomIc IsSUEs 30 (K. Scott & D. Hester ed, 1967). See also Bentley & Macbeth,
Mortgage Lenders and the Housing Supply, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 149 (1972).
33. Altogether 4,287 associations are so insured. Letter, supra note 26.
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1726(a) (1970).
35. Of the 3,585 state-chartered associations, 2,240 are insured. Letter, supra
note 26.
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in the industry to permit certain broad generalizations. All of these as-
sociations depend for their funds primarily on passbook deposit accounts.3 6
While technically associations can require a notice before withdrawal and
may delay payment of funds for varying periods,"7 usually thirty days,
such a requirement is seldom enforced. Competitive forces in the market
effectively preclude invoking these legal sanctions except in extreme cir-
cumstances. Both for historical reasons and because of statutory require-
ments,3" the associations invest very heavily in mortgages, primarily home
mortgages.3" Therefore, their assets are tied up in long-term investments
with maturity dates twenty, thirty or even forty years in the future."
The home mortgage used during the last twenty years is a fully amortiz-
able one, which means that each monthly payment consists of both in-
terest and principal, and therefore even with a thirty or forty year matur-
ity some principal is repaid during the early years.4 Experience has also
shown that because of the mobility of the American people few mortgages
are held to maturity. Most of them are prepaid through refinancing at
sale or otherwise, long before the maturity date." A combination of these
factors indicates that savings and loan associations operate with a revolv-
ing fund and take in principal funds during each business day." Never-
36. In September, 1971, the savings and loan industry had liabilities and reserves
in excess of 199 billion dollars, of which 168 billion dollars were represented by savings
accounts. 57 FED. RES. BULL. A40 (Nov. 1971).
37. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b) (1) (1970).
38. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1970).
39. As of September, 1971, the savings and loan industry held assets in excess of
199 billion dollars, of which 168 billion 'dollars were represented by mortgages. 57
FED. RES. BULL. A40 (Nov. 1971).
40. Some state statutes now authorize savings and loan associations to invest a
percentage of their assets in consumer loans. See, e.g., .ALASxA STAT. § 06.30.520 (Supp.
1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-178(aa) (Supp. 1971); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 170, § 26(8) (Supp.'1971) ; NE. Rav. STAT. § 8-319 (1970) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 393:15-a (Supp. 1971); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 852a, § 5.10 (Supp. 1971). For
examples of some of the recent lending practices by such associations, see Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 6, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
41. For a discussion of the characteristics of the level-premium, fully amortized
mortgage, see L. PEARSON, A THEORErIcAL APPROACH TO HomE MORTGAGE TERMs 2-48
(1969) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, on file in the library of Indiana University,
and available through University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan) [hereinafter
cited as PEARSON].
42. For a study of repayment patterns, see Dhrymes & Taubman, An Empirical
Analysis of the Savhigr and Loan Industry, in 1 STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN
INDUsTRY 67, 115-32 (I. Friend ed. 1969). As the study indicates, repayment rates
diminish in times of rising interest rates.
43. In August, 1971, the Federal Reserve Board published a staff study, R.
FISHER, MORTGAGE REPAYMENTS AS A SoURCE OF LOANABLE FuNDs (1971), which
fully substantiates the revolving fund analysis. However, the study also shows that
(1) there is a secular downward trend in the rate of amortization caused by longer
maturities and higher interest rates, and (2) in times of rising interest rates prepay-
ments decrease.
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theless, the associations essentially operate with funds they borrow short
and lend long."4
The problems created by this method of doing business may become
particularly acute in periods of rising interest rates. To remain competi-
tive the associations must offer a higher interest rate to their depositors.
Furthermore, it is impossible for them to raise their interest rates for new
accounts only, for then existing depositors would simply withdraw their
funds on an interest payment date and take them across the street to a
competitor. This would create monumental bookkeeping problems and
could actually bankrupt some of the associations. At the same time that
they are forced to pay increased rates of return on their accounts, the long-
term nature of their investments limits the yield of their portfolios.
Furthermore, since the amount of interest they are able to pay on their
accounts is limited not only by the effective yield on their long-term port-
folio but also by regulatory agencies, when interest rates rise sufficiently
in the money market, they experience mass disintermediation, that is, many
of their depositors withdraw funds and invest them directly, frequently in
short-term paper. " This reduced attractiveness of their accounts as in-
vestment media, coupled with the prospect of loss of some of the funds
already on deposit directly affects their ability to continue doing business
in the market. The end result is that for the associations to remain liquid
they must curtail their lending activities.4"
It has been argued that savings and loan associations are handicapped
by the lack of diversification of their investment portfolios and by geo-
graphical restrictions which artificially further splinter the market into a
multitude of semi-independent submarkets." Many of these restrictions
have been, or are being, gradually removed and the lending powers of
savings and loan associations generally are being expanded rapidly."
44. For discussions of this syndrome and some of its implications, see Friend,
Changes in the Asset and Liability Structure of the Savings and Loan Industry, in 3
STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 1353 (I. Friend ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as Friend]; Duesenberry, supra note 23; Klaman, Public/Private Approaches to
Urban Mortgage and Housing Problemzs, 32 LAW & CONTEmp. PROB. 250 (1967). This
mode of doing business may create problems not only in times of rising interest
rates but also when interest rates are falling. See Wall Street Journal, Jan. 20, 1972,
at 3, col. 2.
45. See Monetary Policy and the Residential Mortgage Market, 53 FED. RES.
BULL. 728, 732-33 (May 1967) ; RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND, supra note 16, at 14, 21-26.
46. For a study of the liquidity problems of the industry, see Cootner, The Liquidity
of the Savings and Loan Industry, in 1 STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDusRY
283 (I. Friend ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Cootner].
47. For a discussion of the structure of the mortgage markets, see P. GoLDsmiTH,
THE FLOW OF CAPITAL FUNDS IN THE POSTwAR F-CONOmY 274-307 (1965).
48. See, e.g., Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 § 706, Pub. L. No. 91-351,
§ 706, 84 Stat. 462.
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However, the reform movement is by no means completed and further
changes have been either asked for or are in the process of being accom-
plished."
The Studies and Recommendations
Prompted by the experiences of 1966, by the recognized housing
needs of the nation and by the ambitious goals set by the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968,'0 various studies of the country's hous-
ing problems were commissioned. On the national level two separate
studies of the entire field of housing, with particular emphasis on low and
moderate income housing were conducted. 1 Aimed at a more specific
problem, a commission also was appointed to study mortgage interest
rates. 2 At approximately the same time, the FHLBB commissioned its
own study of the savings and loan industry. 3 These studies and reports
emphasized several points. First, despite continuing and increasing de-
ficiencies in the nation's housing stock, the percentage of national re-
sources invested in housing has been steadily declining, both in terms of
the percentage of gross national product and in the percentage of total
borrowing."' Secondly, the studies showed that the housing sector has
consistently borne the brunt of tight money policies. 5 Thirdly, observers
concluded that the burdens of monetary policies should be shared more
equitably and that if the nation's housing goals are to be attained, struc-
tural changes in home financing are necessary.
As a result of these studies, and particularly of the special interest
49. See, e.g., S. 1671, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, §§ 101-05 (1971); IR 7740,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, §§ 101-05 (1971). In order to improve the competitive
position of the associations, the FHLBB announced a change of policy permitting
"satellite" offices in retail stores and automated teller facilities. Wall Street Journal,
June 29, 1972, at 4, col. 1.
50. The Congress reaffirms the national housing goal and determines that
it can be substantially achieved within the next decade by the construction
or rehabilitation of twenty-six million housing units, six million of these for
low and moderate-income families.
42 U.S.C. § 1441a (1970).
51. DECENT Ho E., supra note 1; A a xcA CrTY, supra note 1.
52. The commission was established pursuant to Pub. L. 90-301, 82 Stat. 114
(1968), and filed its report with the President and with the Congress on August 13,
1969. MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES, supra note 21, at ii.
53. STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY (I. Friend ed. 1969).
54. Between 1950 and 1968 the percentage of the gross national product invested
in residential construction declined from over seven per cent to under four per cent.
MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES, supra note 21, at 16, Figure 1. During the same period
residential mortgages, as a percentage of total funds raised, declined from approximately
37 per cent to approximately twenty per cent. Id. at 19, Figure 2.
55. See generally Grebler, supra note 23; MORTGAGE INTEREST RATEs, supra note
21, at 15-26.
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devoted to the savings and loan industry, various proposals were made to
increase the industry's ability to attract and hold funds during tight
money periods." One proposal advocated the extension of the authority
of Fannie Mae into the conventional mortgage market or, preferably, the
creation of a similar specialized institution attuned particularly to the
needs and desires of the savings and loan industry." The Commission on
Mortgage Interest Rates explored these matters" and made its recom-
mendations to Congress which translated them inter alia into the pro-
visions of Title III of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970.0
Legislative History
In 1970, home financing was ushered onto Capitol Hill in an atmos-
phere of crisis.6" A number of bills were introduced in each House,
lumped together under the general heading of emergency home financ-
ing.61 The common theme of all the bills and of most of the testimony
presented during the hearings was the generation of additional financing
for housing. Differences arose concerning the means to this end. Some
proposals suggested weird schemes of forcing pension funds to invest a
56. MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES, supra note 21, at 104-05; Friend, Summary and
Recommendations, in 1 STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 1, 29-34 (I. Friend
ed. 1969).
57. E.g., M. KAPLAN& R. RIcrs, WORKING PAPER #6, SECONDARY MORTGAGE
MARKET (1970) (prepared for the FHLBB) [hereinafter cited as KAPLAN]; L.
GREBLER, COMMENTS ON PROPOSAL TO CREATE A FEDERAL HOME LOAN MARKETING
CORPORATION (1970) (prepared for the FHLBB) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTS ON
PRoPosAL].
58. The Commission sought the opinions of the Federal Reserve Board, but the
Board's attitude was generally negative. For the questions submitted and the answers
given by the Federal Reserve Board, see Housing Productio; and Finance, 55 FED.
RES. BULL. 228, 232-33 (Mar. 1969). The reservations of the Board were again
voiced by Sherman J. Maisel, in 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 68.
59. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation A t, 12 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq.
(1970).
60. Cf. 1970 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 1-3 (remarks of Committee Chairman
Wright Patman).
61. The House bills were: H.R. 13694, H.R. 14639, H.R. 15402, and H.R. 11,
91st Cong., 1st Segs. (1969). The Senate bills were: S. 2958, S. 3503, S. 3508 and S.
3442, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Although most of these bills were introduced in
1969, they nevertheless belong in the category of 1970 legislation because it was only
in 1970 that Congress started to consider them seriously. Hearings were held in
February and March, respectively, by the Committees on Banking and Currency of the
two houses, and both committees reported a single bill in greatly modified fashion.
S. 3685, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 17495, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The
Senate passed its version first and sent it to the House. The House struck the entire
Senate bill, except for the enacting clause, and substituted the bill reported by its com-
mittee. The differences between the houses were resolved by a conference committee
which essentially agreed upon the Senate version with some minor modifications. CONF.
REP. No. 1311, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
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predetermined percentage of their assets annually in home mortgages. 2
Other proposals would have forced the Federal Reserve System to sub-
sidize housing through the purchase of housing agency paper in the open
market,"3 in effect thereby creating new money. Still another proposal
advocated direct subsidy grants from the federal government. 4 Finally,
the suggestion to extend the authority of Fannie Mae into the conven-
tional market and the creation of a similar facility in the Federal Home
Loan Bank System was introduced. However, because of Fannie Mae's
domination by the mortgage banking fraternity, 5 the savings and loan
industry did not view this proposal with enthusiasm. It desired a facility
more responsive to its own particular needs and desires. When FHLBB
Chairman Preston Martin testified before the Congressional committees
he indicated that a new facility, in tune with the industry's structure, was
more desirable. 6 The Corporation is the direct result of these efforts.
PURPOSES AND POLICIES
Although the Corporation is an innovation in the field of federal aid
to home financing, the Charter Act nowhere spells out its purposes.
62. H.R. 15402, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I (1969). See also the dissenting views
of Congressman Patman and Congresswoman Sullivan in MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES,
supra note 21, at 130-32.
The more extreme form of such proposals would have limited the rate of return
on pension fund investments. See the dissenting views of Congresswoman Leonor K.
Sullivan in H.R. REp. No. 1131, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1970), For a criticism
of such schemes, see Bartke, supra note 6, at 74 n.312; Schotland, Private Pension
Funds: A Guide for Modern Investments, 59 GEo. L.J. 355 (1970).
63. E.g., H.R. 15402, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. tit. II (1969).
64. H.R. 13694, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
65. See Bartke, supra note 6, at 59 n.249.
66. 5970 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 57-58; 197o House Hearings, supra
note 2, at 532. While the legislation was pending the FHLBB prepared or com-
missioned some studies of its own. KAPLAN, supra note 57; COMMENTS ON PROPOSAL,
supra note 57. Unlike some members of Congress, who used secondary market termino-
logy without clearly understanding the nature of the organization they were about to
foster, the FHLBB researchers explored the choices open to such a new facility.
They perceived the immediate need to be the provision of additional funds for housing
and the alleviation of the liquidity problems of the industry. KAPLAN, supra note 57,
at 7-10, 18.
The Board initially determined that the Corporation should assume the position of
principal risk-taker in assuring credit and terms to builders-a role which many private
lenders had refused to accept. The Board's decision was reflected in the pricing of
forward commitments for FHA-insured mortgages in terms of fixed discount points
on mortgages carrying the highest permissible face rate of interest at the time of sale.
See FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, SELLER'S GUIDE FHA/VA §
204a(iii) (1971) [hereinafter cited as SELLER'S GUIDE]. (This pricing method is no
longer employed. See text accompanying notes 150-153 infra.) This pricing technique
was different from that employed by Fannie Mae, which priced its pre-commitments
in terms of yield. Hunter, supra note 6, at 823-27. Use of Fannie Mae's method means
that builders are uncertain of the discounts they will have to contend with at the time
of closing.
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These have to be derived from the hearings, the committee reports and
the whole background of information provided by the long history of
Fannie Mae.67
The House and Senate committee reports contain the same laconic
statement:
This title [title III] would authorize the establishment of
a secondary mortgage market facility, called the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation, under the direction of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board .... 68
Implicit in this statement is an assumption that there is a commonly
understood or accepted meaning of the term "secondary mortgage market
facility." To date, however, there are no two writers in the field who
use the term identically.69 Both reports also provide:
The Corporation would be a supplement to, and would
have parallel authority to, the Federal National Mortgage
Association under its expanded authority proposed by title II
of the bill."
This indicates that the history of Fannie Mae and the role it has played in
the past are relevant to the determination of Congressional intent with
respect to the Corporation. However, as indicated previously, the man-
date of Fannie Mae is ambiguous and has forced a certain degree of
schizophrenia upon this organization."' While the absence of more direct
Congressional mandates in the statute itself may help the Corporation
to avoid some of these pitfalls, the provisions of the Charter Act and the
historical ballast forced upon it by the committee reports indicate that
those entrusted with its management will have problems of interpretation.
Despite these ambiguities, some aspects of Congressional intent are
clear. The Corporation is meant to provide additional and dependable
funds for home building and home buying. These funds are to be pro-
vided primarily through the savings and loan industry and secondarily
67. For a history of Fannie Mae, see Bartke, vtpra note 6, at 16-29.
68. H.R. REP. No. 1131, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970); S. REP. No. 761, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970).
69. For a review of definitions, see Bartke, supra note 6, at 7-8 nn.26, 27. My own
definition of the secondary market is: "the ability of mortgage investors, in an organized
fashion either to dispose of mortgages in their portfolios through sale or to convert
such mortgages into securities acceptable to other segments of the investing public,
directly or indirectly." Id. at 7-8.
70. H.R. REP. No. 1131, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970); S. REP. No. 761, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970).
71. See Bartke, supra note 6, at 28-29, 77-78.
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through the mutual savings banks and, to a certain extent, commercial
banks. The Corporation also is intended to alleviate the periodic liquidity
problem of the savings and loan industry. Three factors indicate that
the Corporation is meant to be self-supporting and to obtain most of its
operating funds through the general money markets. First, the structure
of the Corporation is analagous to that of Fannie Mae, which is both
self-sustaining and deeply involved in the money markets. Secondly, the
statute provides for only nominal capitalization but authorizes elaborate
financing provisions involving a variety of market securities.72 This
dependence on the money markets means that, to defray the Corporation's
expenses, the yield on its portfolio must exceed its debt service require-
ments. The same problem was demonstrated by Fannie Mae's experi-
ence in 1969-70." Lastly, the requirement that mortgages purchased
by the Corporation be of a quality acceptable to private mortgage in-
vestors74 is a further indication that active trading in the money markets,
is intended.
The Corporation has authority to purchase both over-the-counter
and by means of forward or pre-commitments. Essentially, forward or
pre-commitments are advance agreements to take up future mortgages
originated by designated mortgage lenders. Both over-the-counter pur-
chases and precommitments are subject to such stringent limitations,
however, that it is virtually impossible for the Corporation to move in
the direction of creating a secondary market facility at this time.
Interrelation Between Titles I1 and III
Before examining the Corporation and title III, some considera-
tion must be given to title II of the Emergency Home Finance Act of
1970." This investigation is necessary because (1) the statutory pro-
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1455(a) (1970).
73. See Bartke, suepra note 6, at 52-53.
74. 12 U.S.C. § 1454(a) (1970).
75. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, tit. II, 84 Stat.
50-51 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 82 (para. 11), 1717(b) (2). This title amended §
302(b) of the National Housing Act by adding a new subsection (2), which provides:
For the purposes set forth in section 301(a), and with the approval of
the secretary of Housing and Urban Development, the corporation is authorized,
pursuant to commitments or otherwise, to purchase, service, sell, lend on the
security of, or otherwise deal in mortgages which are not insured or guaranteed
as provided in paragraph (1), (such mortgages referred to hereinafter as "con-
ventional mortgages"). No such purchase of a conventional mortgage shall
be made if the outstanding principal balance of the mortgage at the time of
purchase exceeds 75 per centum of the value of the property securing the
mortgage, unless (A) the seller retains a participation of not less than 10
per centum in the mortgage; (B) for such period and under such circum-
stances as the corporation may require, the seller agrees to repurchase or -
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visions are very similar, and (2) legislative history indicates that the
provisions are to be complementary.
Title II of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 extended the
purchasing authority of Fannie Mae to include conventional mortgages.
However, certain limitations were placed on this authority. First, con-
ventional mortgage purchases must be approved by the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)." Secondly, subject to ex-
ceptions, purchases are limited to mortgages with a loan-to-value ratio
of not more than 75 per cent."' Thirdly, the proposed House bill pro-
hibited Fannie Mae from offering its securities to help finance its con-
ventional mortgage operations at any time in which, as determined by
the Secretary of HUD, such offerings would inhibit financing of low
and moderate income housing by the Goverment National Mortgage
Association (Ginnie Mae)." Although this proposal was eventually
dropped, the political importance of the view expressed by the House
managers in the conference report may influence the decisions of the
Secretary of HUD.
This last possibility has certain disquieting implications. Because
Fannie Mae views its role as that of a lender of last resort, rather than a
secondary market facility, it will undoubtedly operate by pre-commitments
only, when it starts buying conventional mortgages .7  This means that
replace the mortgage upon demand of the corporation in the event that the
mortgage is in default; or (C) that portion of the unpaid principal balance
of the mortgage which is in excess of such 75 per centum is guaranteed or
insured by a qualified private insurer as determined by the corporation. The
corporation shall not issue a commitment to purchase a conventional mortgage
prior to the date the mortgage is originated, if such morigage is eligible for
purchase under the preceding sentence only by reason of compliance with
the requirements of clause (A) of such sentence. The corporation may
purchase a conventional mortgage which was originated more than one
year prior to the purchase date only if the seller is currently engaged in
mortgage lending or investing activities and if, as a result thereof, the
cumulative aggregate of the principal balances of all conventional mortgages
purchased by the corporation which were originated more than one year prior
to the date of purchase does not exceed 10 per centum of the cumulative
aggregate of the principal balances of all conventional mortgages purchased
by the corporation. The corporation shall establish limitations governing
the maximum principal obligation of conventional mortgages purchased by
it which are comparable to the limitations which would be applicable if the
mortgage were insured by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
under section 1709(b) or 1713 of this title.
12 U.S.C. § 1717(b) (2) (1970) (emphasis added).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 1717(b) (2) (1970).
77. Id.
78. H.R. 17495, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(a) (1970).
79. In this connection consider the revealing statement of Oakley Hunter, Presi-
dent of Fannie Mae, about a policy of not buying above par, and the reason therefor.
Hunter, mipra note 6, at 824.
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for a fee it will enter into contracts to purchase mortgages of a certain
quality sometime in the future. The purchaser of such a commitment,
however, is under no legal obligation to deliver any mortgages," so that
Fannie Mae can never be certain how many of its forward commitments
will actually be exercised, this being a function of market conditions at
the time of maturity. Thus, Fannie Mae must gear its borrowing
activities to the influx of pre-committed mortgages."' Most pre-committed
mortgages will be delivered during money shortages, rising interest rates
and heavy demands for funds.82 However, this is precisely the period
during which the Secretary is exhorted to prohibit additional borrowing.
Therefore, the Corporation must fulfill its pre-commitment contracts and
buy up mortgages at a time during which it may be prohibited from bor-
rowing the money to finance these purchases. Assuming that the Secre-
tary exercises his authority and honors this request, his actions may put
Fannie Mae in a position of having to breach its contractual obligations.
The Senate report accompanying title II implies a further limitation
on Fannie Mae's operations in the conventional mortgage market by cau-
tioning the Association that its primary area of operation should always
be the FHA/VA market."8 Although no corresponding language is
found in title III, the implication would seem to be that the Corporation
should concentrate its efforts in the conventional field. This may indicate
either Congressional concern for continued support of the FHA/VA
market, or an attempt to avoid competition between the two corpora-
tions.8  So far the competition, if any, has been in the FHA/VA field.
The main complaints come from the mortgage banking fraternity which
seems to consider the servicing of FHA/VA mortgages as its mono-
poly. 5 Generally, due to the different structure of the two bodies, their
80. For a discussion of the forward commitment procedures of Fannie Mae,
see Bartke, mepra note 6, at 49-50; Hunter, supra note 6, at 823-25.
81. While this statement is correct, Fannie Mae's demands for funds are more
complex than indicated. It also needs money to refinance outstanding and maturing
issues, and the amount needed depends on repayment schedules and sales. In times
of rising interest rates, however, Fannie Mae's rate of sale of mortgages declines or
reaches zero. For tables showing Fannie Mae's mortgage activities, see Bartke,
supra note 6, at 50-51 n.209.
82. Birtke, supra note 6, ht 50-51 n.209.
83. S. REP. No. 764, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970). Because of the tight money
situation at the time, Fannie Mae was also advised not to enter the conventional field
for ai least two years. Id. Fannie Mae entered the conventional market on February
14, 1972. See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 16, 1971, at 14, col. 1. The first auction of
Fannie Mae forward commitments to purchase conventional mortgages has taken
place. Id., Feb. 16, 1972, at 15, col. 2.
84. See COMMENTS ON PRoPoSAL, supra note 57, at 3-4.
85. See News/Marketing, Making it Big in a Rough Year in a Tough Town-
Centennal of Dallas, 38 Hous. & HomE, July 1970, at 8, 12 [hereinafter cited as Making
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
historical backgrounds and the statutory limitations on the Corporation,
direct competition is highly unlikely. Furthermore, if indirect competition
does materialize, it would seem that the consumer would be the primary
beneficiary.
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
Title III of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 established
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.86 This title, the official
name of which is Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, created
the Corporation as a kind of subsidiary to the Federal Home Loan Bank
System. Following the pattern of the 1954 Federal National Mortgage
Association Charter Act,"T the legislation creates a board of directors for
the Corporation;" grants the Corporation membership in each of the
Federal Home Loan Banks;9 and otherwise endows the Corporation
with the usual attributes of corporate existence."0 The Corporation's
Charter Act also exempts it from all federal, state and local taxes, except
for real estate taxes. 1
The provisions of the Charter Act which define the Corporation's
scope, purpose and mode of operation deal both with mortgage purchases
and with financing. The two will be discussed separately, but there is a
great deal of overlap and interdependence since the availability of funds
and the ease with which they can be procured has a direct effect on the
Corporation's ability to remain in the market and purchase mortgages.
(1) Purchase Operations
The avowed purpose of Congress was to make the mortgage purchase
powers and attributes of the Corporation substantially coextensive with
it Big] ; 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 30, at 256-58 (testimony of Philip C. Jackson,
President of the Mortgage Bankers Association of America).
86. 12 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (1970).
87. Act of Aug. 2, 1954, ch. 649, tit. I, 68 Stat. 590, 612 (1954). For a discussion
of this legislation, see Bartke, supra note 6, at 22-29.
88. There is created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, which
shall be a body corporate and shall be under the direction of a Board of
Directors composed of the members of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
who shall serve as such without additional compensation.
12 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (1970).
89. 12 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (1970).
90. Id. § 1452(b).
91. Id. § 1452(d). In the original version of the bill, as reported by the Senate
committee, the Corporation was supposed to pay the Treasury an amount equal to what
it would have had to pay if it were subject to the Internal Revenue Code. S. 3685, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. § 303(d) (1970). However, as a result of an objection by FHLBB,
the provision was deleted on the floor of the Senate at the motion of Senator Spark-
man. 116 CoNG. REc. 12232 (1970).
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those of Fannie Mae. 2 Fannie Mae has no statutory limitation on the
organizations with which it may do business. It has always limited its
purchases to mortgage originators who are qualified to service the loans
and, for historical reasons, it deals almost exclusively with mortgage
bankers. The Corporation, however, may deal only with savings and
loan associations, mutual savings banks and commercial banks. " This
limitation adds nothing to the stability of efficiency of the home mort-
gage market, but rather creates undue complexities and further sub-
divides the market into submarkets. Furthermore, as we will see later,
it puts limitations on the Corporation's ability to start fostering a second-
ary market for mortgages, since one of the prerequisites to a smoothly
operating secondary market is free access and availability to all those who
need its services.
Other statutory limitations on the Corporation's ability to purchase
conventional mortgages are contained in § 305 (a) (2). Section
305 (a) (1) of the Charter Act authorizes the Corporation to purchase
residential mortgages of such quality, type and class as meet the general
purchase standards imposed by private institutional mortgage investors.94
This standard, by itself, would be excellent since it establishes in general
terms the quality requirements but does not otherwise limit the Corpora-
tion's discretion. However, the § 305 (a) (2) limitations curb this discre-
tion by providing: (1) the outstanding balance at time of purchase is
not to exceed 75 per cent of value, (2) only ten per cent of mortgages
acquired may be originated more than one year prior to pur-
chase, and (3) the principal amounts of mortgages qualifying for pur-
chase must be comparable to the limits imposed by §§ 203(b) and 207
92. (I]n drawing up the legislation, the committee intended to provide FNMA
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (established by title III)
with the same purchasing authority and limitation so there can be a parallel
development of these institutions and so neither would have any competitive
advantage over the other.
H.R. REP. No. 1131, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970). The identical language is found
in S. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970).
93. The Corporation is authorized to purchase, and make commitments to
purchase, residential mortgages from any Federal home loan bank, the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, any member of a Federal home loan
bank, or any other financial institution the deposits or accounts of which are
insured by an agency of the United States.
12 U.S.C. § 1454(a) (1) (1970).
94. Id. It must be noted that the Corporation is not specifically authorized, or
expected, to purchase FHA/VA mortgages. However, the generality of § 305(a) (1),
coupled with the language of the committee reports and with the provision of § 306(a)
authorizing the Corporation to issue mortgage-backed securities under the provisions
of § 306(g) of the National Housing Act, make it clear that such mortgages are
eligible for purchase. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455(a), 1721(g) (1970).
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of the National Housing Act.95 All of these limitations further inhibit
the ability of the Corporation to function freely and create additional
submarkets in an already fragmented field.
The first limitation is presumably designed to decrease risks to the
Corporation. If that is the purpose, it is misplaced since the general
admonition that the mortgages purchased are to be of a quality acceptable
to institutional investors should be sufficient. Furthermore, the limitation
is not coordinated with the loan-to-value ratio limitations imposed by the
FHLBB on federally chartered savings and loan associations,"' which
will be the principal customers of the Corporation.
Although the first limitation is subject to several exceptions," the
exceptions are not integrated with the limitation. Exception (A) pro-
vides that mortgages with balances in excess of 75 per cent can be pur-
chased if the seller retains a participation of not less than 10 per cent of
the mortgage. 8 Obviously, however, this provision can be satisfied with-
out bringing the Corporation share of the balance down to the 75 per
cent level. Exception (B) requires the seller to agree, for a time specified
by the Corporation, to take back or replace mortgages which are in
default.99 The two houses of Congress disagreed on this exception, with
the Senate version imposing a flat three-year requirement for repur-
chase"'0 and the later adopted House version leaving the duration of the
repurchase obligation to the discretion of the Corporation. To comply
with the spirit of the legislation, this period should be long enough to
insure that the unpaid principal of the mortgage is reduced to the magic
75 per cent figure. The original Senate version, while not integrated
with the 75 per cent requirement, might have conceivably been prompted
by the fact that most mortgage defaults occur during the early years in the
life of a loan.1"1
The effect of these two exceptions probably will be negligible.
Exception (B) is not likely to be used extensively because of the presumed
reluctance of sellers to bind themselves for extended periods of time to
95. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1709(b), 1713 (1970).
96. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-1 (1972).
97. 12 U.S.C. § 1454(a) (2) (1970).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Eligible mortgages for purchase would be as follows: ... 3. Con-
ventional mortgages . . . with a loan-to-value ratio of more than 75% if-
. . . (b) the seller agrees to repurchase or replace the mortgage at any time
within three years of the date of purchase in the event of default. ...
S. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970).
101. An excellent recent study, J. HERZOG & J. EA=LEY, HomE MORTGAGE DE.UN-
QUENCY AND FoREcLosuRE 37, 69 (1970), indicates that most mortgage defaults occur
during the second to fifth year, or second to seventh year.
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unpredictable contingent liabilities. Similarly, exception (A) has a
further qualification that mortgages purchased pursuant to it may not be
acquired as a result of pre-commitments. Organizations qualified to
do business with the Corporation are lenders rather than middlemen and
therefore, when they decide to take up mortgages without prior commit-
ments, they usually intend to keep them to maturity. Even if they later
decide to sell, it may be too late since the Corporation must purchase
most conventional mortgages within one year of origination. Because of
this difficulty in purchasing existing mortgages, the net effect of excep-
tion (A) is insignificant.
Exception (C) provides that mortgages with balances greater than
75 per cent can be purchased if the balance above that figure is guaranteed
by a private insurer."2 This exception might be an indirect invitation
to experiment with conventional mortgages with a loan-to-value ratio in
excess of eighty per cent. The FHLBB has just announced that it is go-
ing to experiment with 95 per cent conventional mortgages," 3 which
may provide a test of exception (C)'s workability.
The second limitation, requiring ninety per cent of mortgage pur-
chases to be made within one year of origination,"' is designed to insure
that the funds will be used for additional housing." 5 This explanation is
not particularly convincing. If mortgages are delivered pursuant to
forward commitments, it is safe to assume that the funds were used for
housing as a result of such arrangements. However, when mortgages
are offered for immediate purchase it seems that their age would have
little to do with the use to which the proceeds of sale are put. Of course,
the real purpose might have been to insure that the Corporation would
operate primarily by way of forward commitments. If this is true, Con-
gress did not make its intent very clear. It should be noted, in passing,
that the statute speaks in terms of cumulative aggregates of such mort-
gages, 00 which would indicate that the limitation is not on a year-to-
102. 12 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (2) (1970).
103. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-1(a) (5) (1971).
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (2) (1970).
105. To assure that the bulk of the purchases would make funds available for
additional housing, a further limitation is imposed by the bill relative to the
purchase of newly originated mortgages.
S. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970).
106. The Corporation may purchase a conventional mortgage which was
originated more than one year prior to the purchase date . . . if, as a result
thereof, the cumulative aggregate of the principal balances of all conventional
mortgages purchased by the Corporation which were originated more than one
year prior to the date of purchase does not exceed 10 per cetum of the cumula-
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year basis but is computed on the basis of total purchases from the
beginning of corporate existence. If that is the correct construction, the
unused portion of "older" mortgages in any given year can be used in later
years. Aside from the bookkeeping chores involved, this should make it
possible for the Corporation to purchase larger amounts of seasoned mort-
gages in times of falling interest rates. Sellers are normally anxious to
market their mortgages during these periods since they can demand high
prices. In times of rising interest rates, however, sellers may be reluctant
to sell earlier mortgages since they would have to sell them at a discount
and, therefore, suffer a loss. However, this last assumption is not neces-
sarily correct since the seller may find that the loss of principal occasioned
by sale at a discount is more than made up by the availability, with
rising markets, of new investment opportunities at higher interest
rates."0 7 In any event, the Corporation in developing a secondary market
must stand ready to enter into transactions, both purchase and sale, at
the going market rate, whether this involves discounts or premiums. Any
arbitrary limitations will prevent the full development of the market's
potential.
The Senate committee report indicates that the third limitation, im-
posing ceilings on principle balances of conventional mortgages compar-
able to those of § § 203 (b) and 207 of the National Housing Act," 8 was
designed for the dual purpose of minimizing risk to the Corporation and
channeling funds to low and moderately priced housing."0 9 This reason-
ing, once again, is simply unsatisfactory. No explanation is given why
larger mortgages should be inherently more risky than ones with some-
what smaller balances, and the upper limits imposed can hardly be
described as corresponding with low, or even moderately priced hous-
ing.110 Furthermore, the language used is rather confusing since it
says that the limits are to be comparable to those of § § 203(b) and 207
tive aggregate of the principal balances of all conventional mortgages purchased
by the Corporation.
12 U.S.C. § 1454(a) (2) (1970).
107. For an illustrative computation, see FEDERAL HOmE LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORA-
TIoN, FHA/VA OFFERINGS, PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS].
108. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1709(b), 1713 (1970).
109. S. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970).
110. E.g., the upper limit on § 203(b) mortgages for single family residences is
now established at 33,000 dollars. Taking into account the loan-to-value ratio limitations
contained in the section, the house must sell for an amount in excess of 37,000 dollars in
order to obtain a 33,000 dollar mortgage. 12 U.S.C. § 1709(b)(2) (1970). The
37,000 dollar figure presupposes a minimum down payment under § 203(b) of the
National Housing Act. However, since § 305(a)(2) of the Charter Act calls for a
75 per cent loan-t6-value ratio, the house would have to sell for 44,000 dollars to support
a 33,000 dollar mortgage, unless one of the exceptions were applicable.
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of the National Housing Act. The Senate committee report, however,
dealing with the identical language of title II, states that the conventional
mortgages purchased are not to exceed the limits imposed by the above
sections."' This same report also provides that the limitations and pur-
chasing authority of the two organizations are to be identical." 2 There-
fore, there is some doubt as to whether the limits set by the National
Housing Act are a guidepost for the Corporation or a flat fiat. At pre-
sent, the Corporation has resolved the doubt by adopting a 35,000 dollar
limit.
The statute, further, does not make it clear whether this limitation
applies to the original balance or to the balance at the time of purchase.
The latter interpretation would seem more logical, since the reports state
that security is one of the motives for the limitation, and seasoned mort-
gages are statistically more secure."' This construction would increase,
to a small degree, the flexibility of the Corporation, because it could
acquire mortgages originated more than one year prior to the date of
purchase, within the ten per cent authorization, which originally had
larger balances but had been paid down to the statutory limits.
The over-all modus operandi imposed upon the Corporation by
the statute makes it difficult to foster a secondary market. The bulk of
its operations in 1971 were based on forward commitments. The statute
tries to impose upon it the role of an institutional investor and supplier
of funds to originating mortgagees, while the Corporation makes great
efforts to avoid this position. To correct this situation, the Corporation
has instituted an over-the-counter market in 1972, and is trying to foster
purchases of existing mortgages by means of pricing.
(2) Financing Provisions
To finance its mortgage operations the Charter Act provides the
Corporation with essentially two sources of funds. Section 304111 author-
izes a form of capital stock and § 306".. sets up a mechanism whereby the
Corporation may borrow and issue market securities.
Since the Corporation is a new creation starting from scratch,
Congress provided it with a beginning capital of 100 million dollars in
the form of common, non-voting stock to be issued only to Federal Home
Loan Banks. This financing scheme makes little sense since the same
111. S. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970). Fannie Mae has accepted
this statement. See Hunter, supra note 6, at 834.
112. S. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970).
113. Supra note 101.
114. 12 U.S.C. § 1453 (1970).
115. Id. § 1455.
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result could be accomplished by having the Federal Home Loan Banks
make contributions to the starting capital of the new Corporation. Pos-
sibly, this form was used because a similar method was employed in the
capitalization of Fannie Mae. However, in that context the stock made
somewhat more sense as it was issued to private organizations doing
business with Fannie Mae's secondary market function." 6
The statute provides that such stock may be transferable under
conditions prescribed by the Corporation."' This may be an attempt
to follow the model of Fannie Mae and to provide the mechanism for an
eventual transfer of the Corporation to "private hands.""' Whatever
the reasons for this provision, they certainly should have been stated
more clearly.
Unlike Fannie Mae, which has always been subject to ratio limita-
tions of debt to equity," 9 no corresponding provision is inserted in the
Charter Act. This may have been done because Congress felt that the
close relationship of the Corporation to FHLBB is a sufficient safeguard,
or because it was obvious to the members that 100 million dollars would
not be a large enough base if multiple ratio limitations were introduced,
unless the ratio were so high as to be practically meaningless. It may
also be the result of experiences with quasi-private Fannie Mae, whose
ratio limitations are subject to upward adjustment by the Secretary of
HUD. In the past three years the Secretary has repeatedly exercised
his authority and increased the ratio to make it possible for Fannie 'Mae
to stay in the market. 2 ° In any event, the substitution of a board's
discretion for mechanical ratios is an improvement.
Subsection (d)... permits retirement of all capital stock. This
would tend to negate the possibility of eventual transfer to private in-
vestors. Here is another example of the ambiguity of the Charter Act.
The only limitation on the retirement right is that accumulated reserves
and surplus cannot be less than 100 million dollars. This would
indicate a desire on the part of Congress that the Corporation finance
116. For a discussion of this provision and the developments thereunder, see Bartke,
supra note 6, at 23-27.
117. 12 U.S.C. § 1453(a) (1970).
118. For the background and history of the transfer of Fannie Mae's secondary
mortgage operations to a quasi-private corporation in 1968, see Bartke, mtpra note 6,
at 29-42.
119. 12 U.S.C. § 1719(d) (1970). This section limits the borrowing capacity of
Fannie Mae to 15 times its capital, surplus, reserves and undistributed earnings, unless a
greater ratio has been fixed by the Secretary of HUD.
120. The Secretary has exercised his discretion by increasing the ratio first to
twenty and then to 25 times the basis. See Bartke, supra note 6, at 51 n.211.
121. 12 U.S.C. § 1453(d) (1970).
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itself essentially from borrowings and from internally generated funds
and that the advances of the Federal Home Loan Banks are to be repaid
as soon as business conditions permit. Issuance of stock with a view
toward retiring it as soon as possible underscores the incongruity of the
capital stock structure.
In view of the rather nominal capitalization provided for the Cor-
poration, Congress candidly admitted that "the basic funds to be used
[by the Corporation] to purchase mortgages would [have to] be raised
in the capital market."' 22 The provisions implementing this mandate are
found in § 306 of the Charter Act."2 Although the financing vehicles
listed in this section fall into several clearly defined patterns, the Corpora-
tion has evidenced great imagination in its financing techniques. It has
made more innovations in this respect within one year than Fannie Mae
has done in its thirty year history.
Section 306(a) authorizes the Corporation "to issue notes, deben-
tures, bonds and other obligations, or other securities."' 24 This provi-
sion suggests financing by sale of general obligation securities of different
maturities in the nation's capital markets. This is reminiscent of the
financing pattern employed by Fannie Mae and amounts, in effect, to an
attempt to outguess the trend of interest rates."' When interest rates
climb, the price which the Corporation will be paying for money in the
market will exceed the return on its earlier, lower-rate mortgages. Thus,
outflow may exceed income. Furthermore, these kinds of obligations
compete with all other agency issues and corporate offerings. It is,
therefore, highly questionable whether this sort of financing does much
to increase the share of savings going into housing.2 '
The Act also prescribes financing through mortgage backed securi-
ties issued pursuant to the provisions of § 306(g) of the National Hous-
ing Act.'27 These securities, however, can be issued only against pools
of FHIA-insured, VA-guaranteed mortgages. Since the institutions with
which the Corporation is authorized to do business have, in the past,
generally avoided the FHA/VA market, the supply of mortgages of
this type is rather limited. The device is only useful on a large scale
122. S. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970).
123. 12 U.S.C. § 1455 (1970).
124. Id. § 1455 (a).
125. For a discussion of Fannie Mae's financing problems in tight money markets,
see Bartke, supra note 6, at 52-53.
126. See x97o Sentate Hearings, supra note 21, at 72-75.
127. 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g) (1970). Section 306(g) is specifically mentioned in the
Charter Act. However, it simply authorizes the management and liquidation function of
Ginnie Mae to guarantee mortgage-backed securities. The substantive provisions under
which such securities are to be issued are found in § 304(d) of the National Housing Act.
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if the policy decision is made to encourage the savings and loan industry
to expand its activity in this market. 2 ' This may be desirable since the
life insurance industry, a former power in the FHA/VA field, has con-
ducted a general retreat from the home financing field. 29 The Corpora-
tion has already purchased a considerable amount of FI-A/VA paper
and started financing with mortgage backed securities. It requires that
the sellers of the FHA/VA paper service such mortages, and this has
produced howls of protest from the mortgage banking fraternity which
seems to consider that function as its monopoly.2 However, if this
competition causes the mortgage bankers to increase their capitalization
and take a position in the market, home financing will be the ultimate
beneficiary. With the advent of a secondary market, the role of the mort-
gage banker as merely an originater and servicer will have outlived its
usefulness.
The Corporation has also started a very imaginative program of
selling interests in participations. Under this method, the Corporation
first purchases fractional interests in conventional mortgages, with
savings and loan associations retaining a fifteen per cent interest in each
mortgage sold.' These interests are represented by participation certi-
ficates. The Corporation then issues its own certificates (each one cor-
responding to a mortgage participation certificate which it has pur-
chased), endorses its guaranty thereon, and sells them." 2 This method
is quite similar to creating mortgage backed securities of the "pass-
through" variety23 in conventional mortgages.
Id. § 1719(d). For a discussion of the nature of these securities, see Bartke, supra note
6, at 42-47.
128. The savings and loan industry has already greatly increased its participation in
this market. Between January and August, 1970, the industry originated 850,311,000
dollars of such mortgages. During the same period of 1971, industry originations
were 1,989,835,000 dollars. Letter, supra note 26.
129. See 197o House Hearings, supra note 2, at 67-81 (statement of Kenneth
Wright, Vice President of Life Insurance Association of America). See also the
table in 57 FED. REs. BULL. at A53 (Nov. 1971), which shows a steady decline since
1967 in the amount of FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans held by the life insur-
ance industry.
130. As soon as the Corportion announced its policy the mortgage bankers started
protesting. See Making it Big, supra note 85. See also 1971 Senate Hearings, supra
note 30, at 256-58 (testimony of Philip C. Jackson, President of the Mortgage Bankers
Association of America).
131. PARTICIPATION PROGRAmS, supra note 107, at 1.
132. For a description of the process, see Rev. Rul. 71-399, 1971 INT. REv. B u..
No. 35, at 18.
133. The enabling legislation, 12 U.S.C. § 1719(d) (1970), refers to two types
of mortgage-backed securities - debt obligations and trust certificates of beneficial
interest. These two types have been referred to in the trade as the bond type and
pass-through type, respectively. The former is in the form of a conventional debt
security with a stated maturity date and a fixed coupon interest rate. The latter pro-
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Another example of the kind of imaginative thinking emanating
from the Corporation's management is the recent announcement that it is
exploring the possibility of establishing a futures market for its advance
commitments." 4 Such a futures market would, for one thing, make it
possible for the Corporation to hedge and therefore reduce its own
financial risk. At the same time, it might attract additional resources
into the home mortgage market and thus assist home financing. Further-
more, it would attract a different type of participant to the capital markets
and familiarize them with mortgage paper." 5
As we have seen, the Corporation, circumscribed by its statutory
framework, is in direct competition with many other seekers of funds
in the capital markets. Its problem is essentially that of tapping new
sources. It is attempting to do this by the projected sale of futures in
forward commitments and the sale of interests in participations. It
should, however, attempt to provide new opportunities for small and
medium size investors.
For this purpose, this author has advocated experimentation with
mortgage bonds in small denominations. These bonds would be issued
by savings and loan associations against pools of conventional mortgages,
and would be marketed through tellers' windows. 6 Although such a
scheme would probably require enabling legislation, the present powers
of the Corporation are sufficient to permit some experimentation with
this kind of paper. Section 306(a) permits the Corporation to borrow,
give security, and issue notes, debentures, bonds and other securities.3 7
Section 306(b) expands these powers and authorizes it to establish liens
on all or any part of its assets, and to determine the priority of these
liens." 8 Therefore, there seems to be no impediment to the Corporation
vides for direct fractional participations in the pools; as payments on both principal
and interest are made, they are distributed to the holders. For a discussion of both
types of mortgage-backed securities, see GOVERNMENT NATIONAL MORTGAGE AssociA-
TION, MORTGAGE-BAcKED SECURMTEs GUIDE (1969) [hereinafter cited as GNMA
GUIDE].
134. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 20, 1971, at 6, col. 1.
135. For an excellent discussion of the proposed futures market, see K. PLANT,
THE FUTURES MARKEr FOR MORTGAGES AND COMMITMENTS (1972).
The Chicago Board of Trade is in the process of establishing a pilot futures market
in cooperation with Citizens Savings & Loan Ass'n of San Francisco. Wall Street
Journal, June 21, 1972, at 28, col. 4.
136. For a discussion of these recommendations, see Bartke, Vipra note 6, at 75-77.
137. 12 U.S.C. § 1455(a) (1970).
138. The Corporation may . . . establish prohibitions or restrictions upon
the creation of indebtedness or obligations . . . and create liens and charges,
which may be floating liens or charges, upon all or any part or parts of the
property of the Corporation, including after-acquired property. Such pro-
hibitions, restrictions, liens, and charges shall have such effect, including
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designating a pool of conventional mortgages as security for a series of
bonds and keeping such mortgages segregated on its books. This would
be true of whole mortgages as well as participations. The bonds could
then be issued with staggered maturities to correspond roughly to the
expected repayment schedule. While a perfect matching cannot be
achieved in anything other than pass-through securities, 3 ' the relation-
ship would be close enough for working purposes. In addition, the
guaranty provisions of Section 306(c) 4 could be used as an equivalent
of Ginnie Mae's guaranty powers."4' The issuance of such securities and
their marketing to small and medium size savers could give an oppor-
tunity to test the public's acceptance of both guaranteed and non-
guaranteed bonds.
The pilot project of marketing mortgage bonds in small denomina-
tions would, of course, have to be approached cautiously. Such offerings
could increase liquidity and disintermediation problems of savings and
loan associations if not handled properly. However, if the original offer-
ings were not too large, relatively speaking, and widely distributed geo-
graphically, the impact would be controllable. As experience is gained,
new offerings could be appropriately spaced. In any event, the advantages
of this scheme should outweigh the dangers. Initially, the Corporation
could broaden its borrowing base and therefore, facilitate its financing
operations. Secondly, the public response to this type of security could be
tested and the potential size of the market gauged. Thirdly, experience
gained in the initial stages of the project could be used to refine and per-
fect future instruments. Finally, if the experiment proves to be a success,
it would be easier to approach Congress and ask for enabling legislation
to permit the savings and loan industry, as well as other regulated thrift
institutions, to enter the field directly.
without limitation on the generality of the foregoing such rank and priority,
as may be provided. . . [by] the Corporation....
12 U.S.C. § 1455(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
139. A pass-through type of security is unsuitable for sale to small- and medium-
size investors in small denominations from both the issuer's and the investor's view-
point. From the investor's point of view, the receipt of principal amounts every month
is too complicated and creates too many investment problems. From the point of
view of the issuer, the monthly disbursements would create too many bookkeeping pro-
blems.
140. "The Federal home loan banks shall . . . guarantee the faithful and timely
performance by the Corporation of any obligation or undertaking . . . with respect
to any security ... ." 12 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1970).
141. 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g) (1970). For a discussion of Ginnie Mae's role in the
issuance of mortgage-backed securities based on pools of FHA/VA mortgages, see
text accompanying notes 127-29 =upra; see also Bartke supra note 6, at 46-47, 53-54.
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(3) Relationships to Other Federal Departments
It must be remembered that the Corporation is a subsidiary of the
Federal Home Loan Bank System. It is managed by a Board of Directors
which consists of the members of FHLBB. By statute, the Corporation
is a member of each one of the Federal Home Loan Banks and has all
the benefits, powers and privileges and is subject to all liabilities, condi-
tions and limitations inherent in such membership.'42 Since the Corpora-
tion's capital stock must originally be issued only to the Federal Home
Loan Banks, these banks have complete ownership of the Corporation.
Because of this close relationship, the statute does not provide any further
guidelines or supervisory powers.
Once we go beyond the Federal Home Loan Bank System, however,
the relationships with Federal departments become less clear. Because of
a chance remark in the conference comittee report, we should first ex-
amine the Corporation's relationship with the Treasury Department.
The report comment states:
[I]n approving borrowings for the home loan bank system, the
Secretary of the Treasury should exercise his authority to pro-
hibit FHLBB borrowings at any time that FHLBB borrowings
for conventional secondary market operations would unduly in-
hibit the financing of GNMA special assistance functions.'48
The Charter Act, as such, does not give the Secretary of the Treasury
any supervisory powers over the Corporation's borrowing. The Federal
Home Loan Bank Act does mention the Secretary in three separate sec-
tions,' but not in a way referable to the Committee report's language.
Section 11(i) 4 ' of the Act grants to the Secretary of the Treasury
the authority to purchase obligations issued by the Federal Home Loan
Bank System up to the aggregate amount of four billion dollars and
directs the Secretary to exercise this authority to provide additional liqui-
dity for the system in times of monetary stringency. Although this has
a direct bearing on the marketability of Federal Home Loan Bank securi-
ties, it does not constitute authority to approve or disapprove borrowing.
Sections 22 (a)46 and 23"1 mention the Treasury, but the former provi-
sion deals only with the exchange of information and confidential data,
142. 12 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (1970).
143. CONF. REP. No. 1311, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1970).
144. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1431(i), 1442(a), 1443 (1970).
145. Id. § 1431(i).
146. Id. § 1442(a).
147. Id. § 1443.
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and the latter merely involves mechanical questions concerning the form
of securities issued by the system. The only clear authority given to the
Treasury Secretary is his power to disapprove the issuance of statutory
mortgage backed securities.1 4 Thus, the total relationship is a cloudy
one. Probably, the Secretary's only major influence on the marketability
of the Corporation's securities is his discretion to purchase or not pur-
chase these securities.
Although the Corporation does not have any direct statutory rela-
tionship to HUD, the fact that both agencies are concerned with our na-
tional housing policies may bring them into conflict. A recent example of
such a possibility is HUD's decision to hold the line on interest ceilings on
FHA mortgages.149 As interest rates started declining in late 1970 and
early 1971, the Secretary, in a series of moves, reduced interest ceilings
on FHA mortgages.' However, in the early spring of 1971 the trend
was reversed and interest rates started climbing again. 1' As the discounts
increased, demands were made that the Secretary exercise his discretion
and increase the limits. 2 The Secretary resisted these requests for several
months, until early August, 1971, when the present policy was announced.
Pursuant to this plan FHA mortgages in excess of 22,000 dollars remain
subject to the seven per cent limit and are, therefore, heavily discounted.
On the other hand, those less than 22,000 dollars are being directly sub-
sidized by a new tandem approach.'1 ' This policy decision created many
problems for the Corporation.
The Corporation had interpreted its intended purpose to be the pro-
vision of dependable financing for home building. Responding to the
desire of builders to know in advance the amount of money they would
receive, it started pricing its f6rward commitments differently from the
method used by Fannie Mae." The Corporation promised to purchase,
148. Id. § 1719(d).
149. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 10, 1971, at 6, col. 2; News/Policy, President
Nixon's new game plan to stabilize the national economy and his program to promote
housing and keep mortgage noney flowing, 39 HouSE & HorsE, Oct. 1971, at 4, 8
[hereinafter cited as President's Program].
150. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 2, 1970, at 4, col. 3 (reduction from 8.5 per cent
to eight per cent) ; id., Jan. 13, 1971, at 2, col. 3 (reduction from eight per cent to
7.5 per cent) ; id., Feb. 18, 1971, at 3, col. 1 (reduction from 7.5 per cent to seven per
cent).
151. Wal Street journal, May 26, 1971, at 2, col. 3. The trend continued through
August, id., Sept. 24, 1971, at 20, col. 2, and into September, id., Nov. 1, 1971, at 3,
col. 4.
152. See, e.g., Mandala, FHA Mortgage Market Tumbles Into Disarray as Pres-
sures Build on All Sides, HousE & HomE, July 1971, at 8.
153. The announcement was made on Friday, August 6, 1971. Wall Street Journal,
Aug. 10, 1971, at 6, col. 2.
154. Fannie Mae prices its forward commitments in terms of yield so that at
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at stated discounts, FHA mortgages of an acceptable quality which, at the
time of delivery, bear the highest interest rate then permissible. 55 This
meant that builders could compute in advance the net amount of money
they would receive. Numerous commitments were made at a price of
98, or in other words, at a discount of two percentage "points."1"' This
means that a home seller must make a two dollar lump-sum payment to
the Corporation for each one hundred dollars paid by the Corporation
to the seller. The Corporation assumed that if market interest rates
rose the Secretary would increase the statutory interest limits accordingly.
As a result of HUD's changed policy, the Corporation was left holding a
bag full of some terribly underpriced commitments." 7 This, of course,
produced monumental financing problems. Only a sudden downturn in
interest rates, which started in September, 1971,1" saved the Corpora-
tion from huge financial losses.
Despite the committee reports' insistence on a parallel development
between the Corporation and Fannie Mae," 9 the statute fails to provide
any direct form of coordination between the two. This has been recently
illustrated by the inability of the two entities to agree on a set of standard
forms for conventional mortgages. After months of efforts each entity
adopted its own set of forms.5 ' As mentioned before, there is always the
possibility of competition between the two entities. This competition, in
itself, is not necessarily bad. Because of different historical backgrounds
and statutory limitations, direct competition is highly unlikely. The com-
time of delivery the points charged are computed on the basis of face interest rates.
For a description of this procedure, see Hunter, supra note 6, at 823-24.
155. For a description of the Corporation's original pricing policies, see SELina's
GuWE, supra note 66, § 204 a(ii).
156. Charging "points" is a common method of discounting mortgages. Under
this technique, a price of 98 (or a discount of two points) means that the mortgagee
will lend only 98 dollars for each 100 dollars of face amount, but the mortgagor must
pay interest on 100 dollars. Thus, the mortgagee is compensated for the fact that this
mortgage is subject to an interest rate ceiling.
For FHA mortgages, however, HUD requires home sellers, rather than buyers,
to make the discount payments. See Agencies Boost Home Mortgage Interest Ceiling
in G. L~xcoE, LAzD FiNANcE LAW 985 (1969).
157. The commitments are underpriced because the pre-commitment price of 98
(or a $2/$100 discount payment) was calculated to make up for the difference between
the interest ceiling and the then current market rate. As a result of rising market
rates, this compensation is no longer adequate. The Corporation has recently announced
a new price of 94. President's Program, supra note 149, at 8.
158. This downward trend has persisted into 1972. Wall Street Journal, Jan.
14, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
159. S. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1131, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970).
160. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 16, 1971, at 14, col. 1. The principal differences
between the two sets of forms are in their respective prepayment penalties and due-
on-sale clauses.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
petition, therefore, will be indirect, resulting from their respective pricing
and servicing polices and their own particular mix of conventional and
FHA/VA paper. These policies, in turn, will influence the investment
decisions of the organizations with which they do business. The Cor-
poration also has a direct statutory link to Ginnie Mae through the Cor-
poration's authority to issue and sell statutory mortgage backed securities.
In order to receive Ginnie Mae's guaranty, the Corporation will have
to comply with the regulations issued by that entity.16'
Finally, the Corporation is subject to an audit by the General Ac-
counting Office." 2 Language in the conference comittee report indicates
that this provision was added because of conecrn for the proper relation-
ship of FHLBB, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. and the
Corporation to the General Accounting Office, Bureau of the Budget and
civil service laws generally. 6 '
A LOOK AT THE FUTURE
The Corporation has existed for slightly over one year. Even this
short period of time is sufficient to indicate that its present statutory
framework is not equal to the task. Its problems are both philosophical
and practical. Its philosophical dilemma stems from the ambiguity of its
assigned role. Its practical difficulties are the result of the stringent
limitations imposed by the Charter Act.
The Philosophical Dilemma
The statute and legislative history do not indicate a clear mandate
for the Corporation to follow. This ambiguity goes much deeper than
simply poor draftsmanship. It is primarily caused by the failure of Con-
gress to come to grips with the problem of home financing. Rather than
annual tinkering with specific provisions of housing legislation, we
urgently need an overall definition of housing goals and means for
realizing them."" The difficulty is also caused by failure to appreciate the
operation of certain schemes and to have a clear understanding of the
terms used. The classical example of this problem is use of the term
"secondary mortgage market." As indicated earlier, there is a total lack
of consensus as to the meaning of the term, 6 ' yet it is being used by Con-
161. These regulations are contained in GNMA GUIDE, supra note 133.
162. 12 U.S.C. § 1456(b) (1970).
163. CoNF. P~p. No. 1311, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1970).
164. See Bartke, supra note 6, at 77-78; Bartke, The Organized Bar in Housing
and Urban Development, 4 URBAN LAws. 206 (1972); Rouse & Wehbring, Housing as
a National Priority, 39 GEo. WAsia. L. REv. 674, 684-89 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Rouse].
165. Supra note 69. Oakley Hunter, President of Fannie Mae, purports to describe
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gress without any definition whatsoever. This by itself creates latent
ambiguities, but moreover, this ambiguity hides basic and possibly irre-
concilable differences as to the proper role of the federal government in
housing. An attempt to define such a seemingly innocuous term as
"secondary mortgage market" may bring to the surface the whole range
of inconsistencies in our present housing structure. 6 Once this is brought
into the open, there may be a great practical difficulty in finding a solution
acceptable to Congress.
Nevertheless, such an attempt is overdue and the longer we delay
the more difficult the task will be. In the final analysis, there are only
two directions in which the Corporation may move. First, it can pro-
gressively become a kind of Fannie Mae for the savings and loan industry
and, to a lesser extent, for certain other thrift institutions, with those in-
stitutions gradually assuming the roles of mortgage bankers rather than
investors. If this role is adopted the Corporation will be drawn into a
support operation of undetermined proportion and its entire financing
structure will have to be reviewed and modified. 'More importantly, as
the savings and loan industry relies increasingly on the Corporation for
funding, the industry will lessen its efforts to develop its own sources of
funds. This decrease in new sources will further reduce available outlets
for the funds of small and medium sized savers.167
The other road available to the Corporation would lead it into im-
proving the competitive position of home mortgages in general, and of the
savings and loan industry in particular. This would necessitate devising
new financing schemes for the industry, improving old ones, and upgrad-
ing the liquidity and marketability of home mortgages. The ultimate
goal of such a development would be the creation and fostering of a secon-
dary market in mortgages meeting the definition used in this article.6
While the early clarification of goals by Congress would be desirable,
it may not be practicable. The ambiguity of goals in the Charter Act per-
mits the Corporation itself, to a certain degree, to chose its goals and the
the operation of a secondary market in a recent article. See Hunter, supra note 6,
at 819-20. However, the transactions described by Hunter are atypical of the way
in which Fannie Mae does business.
166. For example, the question of whether organizations such as Fannie Mae,
and presumably now the Corporation, should deal only with lenders or should make
direct loans has been a bone of contention ever since the enactment of title III of the
National Housing Act of 1934. See Bartke, supra note 6, at 17. This issue is still not
resolved philosophically although Fannie Mae is a large institutional investor. The
use of the "secondary market" terminology has helped to hide the question. See Rouse,
supra note 164, at 688-89.
167. See Bartke, supra note 6, at 47, 75-76.
168. Supra note 69.
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direction in which it moves. However, this freedom of choice is hampered
by the administrative restriction imposed on the Corporation.
The Administrative Problems
The present Charter Act limits the Corporation's flexibility and pre-
vents it from developing a comprehensive secondary mortgage market.
The solution is to try to get Congress to relax the restrictions it has
written into the Act. Attempts to achieve that solution, however, en-
counter the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the desire is to get as
much relaxation of the restrictions as fast as possible. On the other hand,
piecemeal reforms may mask imperfections and prevent fundamental
change. There is much truth in the saying that the "good" is the enemy
of the "excellent."
(1) Short-Range Solutions
As a result of these considerations, a policy decision has been made
to attempt gradual, rather than long term, improvements. The first batch
of recommendations is now pending before Congress in the form of title
III of the Housing Institutions Modernization Act of 1971."69 Although
the bill was not reported by either committee in 1971,170 there are indica-
tions that some kind of housing legislation will be passed in 1972. The
proposed bill is also concerned with matters other than the improvement
of the operations of the Corporation,' 7 ' and if passed, would introduce
far-reaching changes into the structure of federally chartered savings and
loan associations and indirectly into the savings and loan industry as a
whole.
The changes envisioned by the proposed legislation are all directed
towards relaxation of some of the restrictions imposed upon the purchas-
ing powers of the Corporation. None of them are directly concerned with
financing as such. 72 One change would permit the Corporation to repur-
169. The bill was introduced almost simultaneously in identical form in both the
House and the Senate. H.R. 7740, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1671, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971).
170. The same fate befell the other major housing bill introduced in 1971-
"Housing Consolidation and Simplification Act of 1971," S. 2049, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971). This bill has essentially rbecome Ch. 1 of "Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1972," S. 3248, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), which passed the
Senate on March 2, 1972, 118 CoNG. REc. S3152 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1972), and was
sent to the House.
171. S. 1671, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), consists of four titles. Title I proposes
several changes in the structure of federally chartered savings and loan associations;
title II deals with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and title IV with the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. Thus, the bill deals with the main component
of the Federal Home Loan Bank System.
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chase, from any holder or owner, mortgages it had previously sold."'
This change may be viewed either narrowly or broadly. In the narrow
sense, it might stimulate the Corporation's sales activities by allowing the
Corporation to tell prospective purchasers that if they should be in need of
liquid funds in the future, there may be a market open to them. On the
other hand, this change may be viewed broadly as the opening wedge in
attaining the eventual goal of making the Corporation available to all
qualified parties. An organization which aspires to the role of a second-
ary market facility must provide access to its facilities, directly or in-
directly, to all those in need thereof. Another proposed amendment may
also be viewed as an attempt to facilitate secondary market operations;
it would increase the limits on purchases of seasoned mortgages from ten
per cent to twenty-five per cent of total mortgages purchased" thereby
making its secondary mortgage function more available.
Other proposals contained in this legislation are more limited and
technical. One would change the loan-to-value limitation,' thereby bring-
ing it in line with the present FHLBB regulations.' In cases where the
mortgage qualifies for purchase because the seller is to retain a participa-
tion, another proposal would eliminate the present prohibition against pre-
commitments.' To the extent that the Corporation continues to operate
with pre-commitments or moves in the direction of a support operation
and investor position, this proposal may be significant. If, however, the
Corporation starts moving in the direction of a secondary market facility,
its use of forward commitments should drastically decline.
(2) Long-Range Legislative Goals
On the assumption that the ultimate goal of the Corporation is im-
proving the position of residential mortgages in the nation's money
markets through the creation of a secondary market facility, the long-
range legislative objectives should all point in one direction-the elimina-
172. This statement is not technically correct, since S. 1671, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 305 (1971), provides that the securities issued by the Corporation are lawful invest-
ments for fiduciaries. However, the section would simply make explicit what is
already implicit in the Charter Act.
173. S. 1671, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (which would amend 12 U.S.C. §
1454(a) (1) (1970)).
174. S. 1671, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1971) (which would amend 12 U.S.C. §
1454(a) (2) (1970)).
175. S. 1671, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (1971) (which would amend 12 U.S.C. §
1454(a) (2) (1970), by increasing the loan-to-value ratio from 75 to eighty per cent).
176. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-1 (1971). The eighty per cent ratio is the norm; however,
there are several exceptions thereto.
177. S. 1671, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 304 (1971) (which would amend 12 U.S.C. §
1454(a) (2) (1970)).
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tion of the artifical restrictions written into the Charter Act. These
restrictions are: (1) the limitation on the type of institutions with which
the Corporation may do business; (2) the artificial restrictions on the
kind of mortgages it is permitted to deal in; and (3) the limitation on the
date of origination of mortgages."' Each one of these is inimical to the
ideal of a secondary mortgage market.
Although the Corporation, or any other secondary market facility,
would deal primarily with traditional mortgage investors, it should be
legally entitled, and also practically prepared, to do business with all who
need its services. Once such a facility is firmly established and operational,
it is possible that a new class of middlemen or brokers may develop to
serve the needs of those who only occasionally may have an opportunity
to use the service.
1 7 9
All restrictions on the quality of paper eligible for purchase or trad-
ing by or through the Corporation should be eliminated, other than the
requirement that the paper be of a quality acceptable to institutional in-
vestors. This standard, which already is written into the Charter Act and
which is somewhat akin to the "prudent man rule" of the law of trusts,
is entirely sufficient. As far as trading is concerned, even this standard
may be too stringent. With an efficient rating system, paper of lesser
quality, properly labeled, should be eligible and made available to those
who may be willing to sacrifice some security in exchange for a higher
yield. Of course, there would be some limit below which the Corporation
would not want to venture. This choice, however, should be left to the
Corporation.
The artificial limits on the principal amounts of mortages must be
removed. Similarly, the age of mortgages should have nothing to do with
their eligibility for trade. All available studies indicate that the highest
178. Supra notes 93 & 95 & text accompanying.
179. The creation of brokerage services in this field has started. The Kislak
group organized a new corporation, the J. I. Kislak Mortgage Company, Inc., to
perform nationwide brokerage functions. The corporation advertises regularly in
publications such as Savings and Loan News.
In addition, the Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corp., of Milvaukee, Wisconsin,
which specializes in insuring conventional mortgages, announced the formation of a
subsidiary to buy and sell mortgages. The new corporation, known as MGIC Invest-
ment Corp., has obtained the services of William B. Ross, former executive vice-
president of Fannie Mae. Konzelman, More Help for Buyers, Detroit News, Feb. 27,
1972, at 1-G, col. 6. The new corporation is in the process of developing operational
policies and procedures and has not, as yet, entered the market. Source: Letter dated
March 16, 1972, from William B. Ross, Senior Vice President, MGIC Investment
Corp., to Richard W. Bartke (a copy of which is on file in the offices of the Indiana
Law Journal). It proposes to buy over the counter and issue forward. commitments,
which, however, will not obligate the seller to deliver. It will not buy at a premium.
MGIC MORTGAGE Cos'oaATiox, SELERs GUIDE (1972).
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rate of default and foreclosure occurs during the early years of a mort-
gage' On the other hand, once a mortgage has reached a certain matur-
ity its marketability decreases simply because the proportion of principal
to interest in each payment increases rapidly,' and with servicing costs
approximately constant, the net return actually decreases. However, such
variations will be taken care of by mharket quotations and therefore this
problem should not affect the mortgages' trading potential.
On the affirmative side, the Corporation should, over a number of
years, seek statutory authorization to engage, not only in buying, but also
in establishing trading desks or floor operations. Such authorization is
clearly implied in the Charter Act,"8 2 but a specific statement to this effect
would be desirable to eliminate any doubts on the part of more conser-
vative investors. The Corporation should further propose amendments
broadening the borrowing powers of the various institutional investors
such as savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks. In the
future, the demand for home financing will be progressively more com-
plex,'83 due to the increased amount of such financing and to newer, more
sophisticated financing instruments.' Broadened powers will help the
industry cope with these demands. These improvements cannot be
achieved, however, until we have assured a steady and dependable share
of capital funds for the home mortgage market. In this connection, the
fragmentation of the market into submarkets, functional and geographical,
is counterproductive. Anything which artifically impedes the free flow
of funds to the areas of greatest need is a disservice to the cause of home
financing.
The ultimate objective of these activities is an increase in the amount
180. Supra note 120.
181. This can be illustrated by the following hypothetical. If we assume a 20,000
dollar mortgage, at seven per cent interest, repayable in 240 monthly installments of
$155.20, the payments at the indicated times would be:
Interest Principal
1st payment $116.60 $ 38.60
60th " 100.80 54A0
120th " 78.20 77.00
180th " 46.00 109.20
239th " 1.40 153.80
See FINANCIAL PUBLISHING COMPANY, MONTHLY PAYMENT DIREcT REDUcTION LOAN
AMORTIzATIoN ScHErurxs 7%-33 - 7%-35 (11th ed. 1967).
182. "The Corporation is authorized to purchase . . . and to hold and deal with,
and sell or otherwise dispose of . . . any . . mortgage or interest therein." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1454 (a) (1) (1970).
183. The level-payment, fully amortized mortgage in general use today has recently
been criticized on the ground that it fails to account for the different needs of various
classes of borrowers. See text accompanying notes 199-200 infra.
184. See proposed amendments to 12 C.F.R. §§ 541, 545, contained in 36 Fed. Reg.
20311 (1971).
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of funds channeled into home financing and the attraction of new sources
of supply for these funds. Some promising sources are the real estate in-
vestment trusts established pursuant to the provisions of part II of sub-
chapter M of the Internal Revenue Code. 5 The ability to use the Cor-
poration's facilities would make it that much more attractive for these
trusts to enter the market. This would be particularly true if the trustees
are primarily interested in an equity position but either desire qualifying
investments... for surplus funds or wish to maintain a defensive posture.
Furthermore, both the more conservative and the more adventuresome of
trusts may be interested in trading in the proposed futures market for
forward commitments ;11T the former to hedge and thus diminish risks,
and the latter to speculate for higher returns. This interest should extend
both to forward commitments by the Corporation and commitments by
other institutional investors who may follow the Corporation's lead once
the experiment has proved successful. It would be necessary, however,
to obtain an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code to insure that the
income derived from such trading qualifies under the Code. 88
Non-Statutory Considerations
In anticipation of future statutory relaxations, the Corporation must
plan for many things which are not directly related to its statutory frame-
work. As stated previously,'89 mortgages lack two prerequisites of a
smoothly operating market, namely homogeneity of the product and fun-
gibility of the trading units. Part of the problem was eliminated in one
segment of the market by the introduction of FHA insurance which has
185. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 856-58. For a description of the operation and
qualification of real estate investment trusts, see Comment, Usury and Real Estate
Investment Trusts: An Analysis of Treasury Regulation 1.856(c)(z)(ii), 60 CALIF.
L. RFv. 147, 147-51 (1972).
186. To qualify for the benefits of Part II of subchapter M a real estate invest-
ment trust must derive the predominant part of its gross income from real property
assets. INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, §§ 856(c) (2)-(4).
187. See text accompanying notes 134-35 supra.
188. Presently, a real estate investment trust must qualify under the income
limitations of §§ 856(c) (2) (D) and 856(c) (3) (C) of the Code. It is doubtful that
gains on trading of futures in forward commitments in real estate mortgages would
qualify under these provisions. See the definition of "real estate assets" and of
"mortgages on real property" in Treas. Reg. § 1.856-3 (b).
The suggestion that an amendment to the Code is desirable may seem inconsistent
with the proposition advanced later in this paper that tax incentives are not necessarily
the best way to achieve housing goals. Infra notes 207-10 & text accompanying.
However, proposals should be pragmatic; since tax incentives are in vogue, proponents
of increased federal action to achieve housing goals should take this into account when
formulating recommendations.
189. Supra notes 15 & 16 & text accompanying.
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provided a certain amount of uniformity among mortgages. 0' This per-
mitted nationwide mortgage lending by life insurance companies in the
1950's and created a vast network of correspondents and servicers."9'
Recently, it has been suggested that the situation could be improved fur-
ther by removing residual risks from FI-A mortgages and insuring the
stability of monthly cash flows rather than merely guaranteeing the repay-
ment of principal. "2 This is not the place to discuss the merits or demerits
of the suggestion, but it must be stressed that it only applies to FHA mort-
gages and does nothing for the conventional market.
In order to facilitate its entry into the conventional market, the Cor-
poration has already initiated a number of steps. First, it has attempted
to draft a set of standardized forms to be used by all savings and loan as-
sociations, and other thrift institutions, which want to do business with
the Corporation. 3 Although such forms would improve the situation, the
forms must operate in fifty different legal systems, and many of the pro-
visions of state substantive law in these areas cannot be altered or waived
by agreement of the parties. This raises the problem of unification of
mortgage laws. The task has been undertaken," 4 but it will be many years
before it comes to fruition, even if an eventual code of real estate transac-
tions is adopted as widely as the Uniform Commercial Code. "5
Another problem facing a prospective purchaser of a mortgage is
the evaluation of the commodity he is about to acquire. If, in each in-
stance, the investor must undertake an independent investigation of all
the factors, the transaction becomes too cumbersome and expensive. A
possible answer would be a national rating system for conventional mort-
gages and the Corporation should, if possible, start preparing for such a
190. See Bartke, supra note 6, at 10-11.
191. This does not mean that all impediments to the free flow of funds have been
removed. A.B.A. Committee on Real Estate Financing, Impediments to Free Flow of
Funds in Mortgage Market, 6 REAL PROPERTY PR B. & TRUSTS J. 215 (1971).
192. This has been accomplished indirectly through Ginnie Mae's guaranty of
mortgage-backed securities, particularly those of the pass-through variety. Investor
acceptance of the paper seems to be increasing. Wall Street Journal, June 21, 1972, at
36, col. 1. For a full discussion of the proposal, see Guttentag, Changes in the Structure
of the Residential Mortgage Market: Analysis and Proposals, in 4 STUDY OF THE
SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 1479, 1510-33 (I. Friend ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
Guttentag].
193. Although controversial, see Associations Confront the Critical Consumer,
SAVINGS AND LOAN NEws, June 1971, at 28; Wall Street Journal, Oct. 26, 1971, at 40,
col. 1, the forms have been adopted. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 6, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
194. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have appointed a committee to
study a real estate transactions code.
195. The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted in all states, except
Louisiana, and in the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands. A.L.I. & NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CoDE table 1, at xxxv (official text 1972).
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system.' In this connection, the Corporation may assist the cause of uni-
fication and simplification of real estate law by including the local mort-
gage law as one of its rating elements and assigning minus points to those
jurisdictions whose laws unfairly discriminate against the security of the
instrument. The market may have already responded to this discrimina-
tion by retarding the flow of funds to such jurisdictions, in which event
the Corporation would simply be recognizing something which has existed
for a long time. However, even such recognition may be beneficial, since
considerable publicity might generate needed legislative action.
A further problem with trading mortgages is that the principal
amounts, even originally, are different depending on the borrowing needs
of the mortgagor. Therefore, they do not present readily quoted units.
However, many of the objections to trading in individual mortgages can
be eliminated if the trading unit-is an undivided interest in an underlying
pool, rather than a particular mortgage or block of mortgages. If a de-
pendable rating system is introduced and if all the mortgages in the pool
are of the same quality, the very size of the pool and the number of the
units in it provide the necessary homogeneity. At that point the chances
of default and the extent thereof can be predicted statistically. This pre-
dictability transforms the commodity into a homogenous one, and by di-
viding the common mass into trading units of 50,000 or 100,000 dollars,
fungibility of trading units is also achieved." 7 This scheme would make it
feasible to start trading participations in conventional mortgage pools,
facilitated by a national market with an efficient system of reporting prices,
bid and asked. Such a market could constitute an excellent barometer of
the price of home financing money.
The previous discussion assumed that the mortgages underlying the
pool would be of the equal payment, fully amortized kind which is almost
universally employed now. However, these mortgages, which came into
widespread use as a result of the enactment of the National Housing Act
of 1934 and the activities of FHA, 9 ' have recently been criticized. 9 ' The
196. Professor Guttentag feels that a rating system is unnecessary if his proposal
for cash flow insurance by FHA is adopted. That may be true in respect to the FHA
market, but it does nothing for conventional mortgages. See Guttentag, supra note 192,
at 1530-33.
197. In view of the language of Rev. Rul. 71-399, 1971 INT. REv. Bu.'. No. 35, at
18, clarifying amendments to §§ 593(e) and 7701(a) (19) (C) (v) of the Internal
Revenue Code are needed to insure that the proposed trading units qualify as "qualify-
ing real property loans" and "loans secured by an interest in real property." Similarly,
clarifying amendments would be needed in the case of § 856(c) (6) (C) and Treas. Reg.
§ 1.856-3(b), which define "real estate assets" for purposes of determining whether
there is a real estate investment trust.
198. See Hearings on S. Res. so2 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban
Redevelopment of the Sen. Special Comm. on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning,
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main shortcoming is that they equate all borrowers and put them into an
identical mold, whereas borrowers' needs and desires may be quite dif-
ferent. In response to this problem, FHLBB has recently announced a
proposed amendment to its rules which would permit federally chartered
savings and loan associations to tailor the terms of their mortgages to the
conditions of their borrowers."' 0 This will introduce further variations
into the already complex and non-uniform nature of mortgages: i.e., dif-
ferent rate of repayment, varying mix between interest and principal, dif-
ferent relation of rate of repayment to obsolescence and a host of others.
However, with an efficient rating system which would take these added
variables into account, and with pools of sufficient size, it would seem that
even these variations could be accommodated; i.e., those mortgages with
limited principal payments and a large balloon payment at maturity could
be balanced in the pool by those with more rapid repayment schedules and
prepayment privileges. To preserve the homogeneous nature of the com-
modity, this development makes it even more imperative that trading be
in terms of participations in large pools.
The above suggestion, of course, is the counterpart of the conversion
of mortgages into bonds of small denominations, suitable for small and
medium sized savers."' Participations in large pools would be available
only to large investors because of the very size of the trading unit. The
two approaches are complementary and each is designed (1) to tap addi-
tional resources and make more funds available for home purchases and
(2) to improve the liquidity position of the various institutional mortgage
investors by both breaking the vicious borrowing-short-lending-long syn-
drome and creating a market in which interests in mortgages can be ex-
peditiously converted into cash as the need may arise. Obviously, such a
market cannot fully succeed until the statute is amended to make the Cor-
poration's services more available.
The Corporation will most likely start experimenting with the pos-
sibilities of such a market, once it has begun purchasing conventional
mortgages and has gained some experience in the area. Concurrently with
its regular purchase program, the Corporation might encourage savings
and loan associations, and others with whom it is entitled to deal, to start
trading participations in pools of mortgages and assist such endeavors by
helping to publicize prices and rating quality. The experience gained in
78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1283-84 (1945); M. COLEAN, ImpAcT OF GOVERNMENT ON REAL
ESTATE FINANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950).
199. Guttentag, supra note 192, at 1540-43. PEARSON, .supra note 41, at 59-101.
200. 36 Fed. Reg. 20311 (1971). For an immediate reaction, see Wall Street
Journal, Oct. 21, 1971, at 7, col. 1.
201. See text accompanying nofes 134-41 supra.
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such a limited market might help to refine the overall procedure and
smooth out its operation by the time it is launched on a national scale.
To facilitate the development of such a market § 305 of the Charter Acte 2
should be amended to explicitly authorize the Corporation to organize
and operate limited trading floors."'
In its continued quest for improved home financing, the Corporation
is exploring various approaches, including the concept of variable interest
mortgages. Instead of the present form of constant interest rates through-
out the life of the loan, such mortgages would have a rate which would
rise or fall, depending on the overall interest level in the economy. The
movement, of course, will have to be contractually agreed upon and be
tied to some external and objective standard." 4 This kind of mortgage,
it is claimed, would help break disintermediation problems of savings and
loan associations and other thrift intitutions in times of rising interest
rates. It would be easier for the institutions to increase the rate they offer
to their depositors when their own rate of return on their entire portfolio
rises accordingly." 5 Unfortunately, it will take many years before the in-
stitutions accumulate a large enough backlog of this kind of paper to make
the proposal effective. Moreover, while the device would almost certainly
be very efficient as far as passbook savings accounts are concerned, it is
not clear that it would meet the needs of many institutional investors
whom the Corporation is attempting to interest in the home mortgage
market. In times of rising interest rates, such investors would probably
be interested in purchasing either individual variable interest rate mort-
gages, or participations in pools of such mortgages, since they would
currently be getting the market rate of return and their investment would
also have potential for higher return in the future. However when interest
rates go down, the same investors might very well withdraw entirely from
the market if they can only purchase variable interest rate mortgages.
Although they would currently be buying the market rate of interest, pur-
chase is doubtful because their investments would have a built-in reduced
202. 12 U.S.C. § 1454 (1970).
203. Although such an amendment is highly desirable, it is not a sine qua non.
See text accompanying note 181 spra.
204. The choice of an appropriate standard poses considerable problems. See
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 22, 1971, at 6, col. 3. The concept of a floating interest rate
has received qualified approval from the Commission on Financial Structure and
Regulation. PRESIDENT'S CommIssioN ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGULATION,
TiE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S Com-missIoN ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND R.EGULA-
TION 77, 82-83 (1971).
205. For discussions of some of these problems, see Grebler, supra note 23, at
1308-50; Friend, supra note 44, at 1408-27; Cootner, supra note 46, at 283. See also
sources cited in Bartke, supra note 6, at 76 n.318.
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return as interest rates declined further. At this point, competitive invest-
ents, such as corporate bonds with fixed interest rates and long periods
of no prepayment, would be considerably more attractive.
FEDERAL SUBSIDIES
A discussion of the home financing problem is not complete without
some mention of federal subsidies."' Because a certain segment of our
population cannot afford the market prices of housing,"' the federal
government has increasingly assumed a support role and has provided
various subsidies for so-called low and lower-middle income groups."
Most of these supports are indirect by way of either encouraging certain
investors to invest in rental housing via very attractive tax provisions or
by partially subsidizing some of the elements going into the total cost of
housing, particularly interest. Because of the indirect manner in which
subsidies are provided, there is an interplay between subsidy and market
structure which complicates and confuses both.2" Recently, a very
spirited debate has arisen over their general usefulness.21
In this connection, questions are asked whether the right people are
being subsidized, whether the social cost is justified and whether the sub-
sidy actually achieves the desired ends. The accumulation of data to date
tends to indicate that some of these schemes are exceedingly inefficient
in channeling resources.2 ' More importantly, from our immediate point
of view, some of the more recent studies seem to indicate that tax subsidies
206. The concept of subsidization is not clear, and there is a lively debate over
what constitutes a subsidy. For example, there is much debate as to whether § 203 of
the National Housing Act constitutes a subsidy. See S. GRER, URBAN RENEWAL AND
AtERICAN CITrEs 134-35, 150-51 (1966); B. WEIssBoUl, SEGREGATION, SUBSIs,
AND MEGALOPOLIS 5-6 (1964).
Similarly, there is a lively discussion as to whether the deductibility of mortgage
interest under § 163 and the deductibility of real estate taxes under § 164 of the Internal
Revenue Code are subsidies. See Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of
Income Tax Reform, 80 HARv. L. REv. 925 (1967) ; Bittker, Comprehensive Income
Taxation: A Response, 81 Harv. L. REv. 1032 (1968) ; Galvin, More On Boris Bittker
and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicalities of Tax Reform and the ABA's
CSTR, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1016 (1968); Musgave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81
HAR,,. L. REv. 44 (1967). Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Conment,
81 HARv. L. REv. 63 (1967).
207. See DECENT HOME, supra note 1, at 39-50.
203. For a history of such efforts, see Rouse, supra note 164.
209. See Bartke, supra note 6, at 65-69.
210. See note 206 supra.
211. For a detailed discussion of the impact of accelerated depreciation and leverage
on various tax bracket taxpayers, see McKee, The Real Estate Tax Shelter: A Com-
puterized Expose, 57 VA. L. REv. 521 (1971) [hereinafter cited at McKee]. Another
recent article, although starting from a different premise, supports Professor McKee's
conclusions. Sunley, Tax Incentive for the Rehabilitation of Housing, 39 APPRAISAL J.
381 (1971). But see Guido, The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of x969 on the Supply
of Adequate Housing, 25 VAND. L. REV. 289 (1972).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
actually work against home financing by insulating certain favored groups
from the effect of changing interest rates.212 To the extent that these very
high bracket taxpayers are almost impervious to changes in interest rate
levels, they are in a position to outbid their competition and, therefore, in
times of rising interest rates, their activities further accentuate the de-
pressing effect of such rates on housing.
CONCLUSION
The housing situation is becoming critical. We cannot have housing
without adequate and dependable financing. To provide this financing
we need an efficient system of encouraging thrift, collecting savings, and
channeling such savings into housing. To do this, investment in mort-
gages must be made attractive to various classes of investors, small and
large.
We should improve the position of home financing paper in the
money markets of the nation, simplify the structure generally and make it
as efficient and, therefore, as cheap as we possibly can. Having done
that, we should also reassess our national goals to decide whether an ad-
ditional subsidy is needed and devise the most direct and most effective
means of providing such a subsidy.213 In devising such subsidies, the
touchstone should be fair effectiveness, not their immediate effect on
the federal budget.
The title of this piece, "Home Financing at the Crossroads," may
sound overly dramatic or represent an attempt at emulating a journalistic
headline. However, the underlying thought seems to be well taken. We
have coasted a long time on past wisdom and attempted only patchwork
repair of the most glaring defects in our home financing edifice. This
form of remedy cannot continue much longer.
212. McKee, supra note 211, at 532-41; Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The
Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Govermnental
Assistance, 84 HARV. L .REV. 352, 395-408 (1970).
213. HUD is presently experimenting with the concept of a housing allowance.
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 10, 1972, at 8, col. 3; id., Jan. 19, 1972, at 10, col. 1.
